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ABSTRACT 
Recently, a growing number of trust studies focus on the topic of trust repair and expands trust 
research to a trust building-violation-repair process. When trying to answer the question o f how 
trust can be effectively repaired, most researchers start from the violator's standpoint such as 
comparing different reparative tactics. However, trust repair is a bilateral process in which both 
violator and vict im are influential. This thesis is aimed at addressing this gap by examining 
victim's commitment in trust violation and repair. As this study is based on a cognitive 
perspective, continuance commitment, which represents the cognitive dimension of commitment, 
is particularly selected and examined. It is proposed that continuance commitment would 
influence trust violation in a way that when continuance commitment is high, trust violation is 
less severe in terms of trust decline. Similarly, continuance commitment is hypothesized to 
impact trust repair that when continuance commitment is high, trust is more effectively repaired 
and trust rebuilding is faster. Meanwhile，the two sub-dimensions of continuance commitment, 
investment size and quality of alternative, are considered separately. Two 2 x 2 (investment size: 
high/low X quality of alternative: high/low) experimental studies of repeated trust game are 
conducted with computer-aided interface. Participants play a two-player game for several rounds 
in which their partner is a confederate and tries to repair trust after violation. Results supported 
the hypotheses that continuance commitment increases the effectiveness of trust repair as trust 
repair is faster among participants in high commitment group. However, no evidence is found to 




















Trust is a prevailing phenomenon in various types of relationships within human society. It has 
long been recognized as an important issue in the business world and researchers have been 
studying this topic for decades, trying to understand the nature of trust (Mayer, Davis, and 
Schoorman，1995; McAllister, 1995; Rousseau et al.，1998), to find the predictors of trust 
building (e.g., Malhotra and Mumighan, 2002; Dunn and Schweitzer, 2005; Lau and Liden， 
2008)，to describe the trust process (e.g., Lewicki, Tomlinson, and Gillespie, 2006), to identify 
outcomes of trust (e.g., Robinson, 1996; Colquitt, Scott, and LePine, 2007)，and more recently, 
to study how trust is repaired after violations (e.g., Bottom et al., 2002; K im et al., 2004; 
Tomlinson, Dineen, and Lewicki 2004). As the topic expands to a dynamic view of trust and 
trust is more regarded as a building-violation-repair process, a new field of trust repair emerges 
with much unknown issues waiting to be uncovered. 
As trust involves exposure to vulnerability, it can be violated when positive expectation towards 
the trustee is unmet. The violation of trust is phenomenal as researchers have noticed a 
worldwide decline in trust like low trust towards employers, companies, and government (Dirks, 
Lewicki, and Zaheer, 2009). The violation of trust is so prevalent that some research even 
suggest that such violation is "the norm" rather than incidents (Robinson and Rousseau, 1994). 
The lack of trust makes trust repair is a salient issue but repairing trust is not an easy task (e.g., 
K im et al., 2004, 2006; Ferrin et al., 2007). Although the topic of trust repair is receiving 
growing attention, there are much more to be done for a deeper understanding (Dirks, Lewicki, 
and Zaheer, 2009). 
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In this study, I intend to look into the trust violation and repair dynamics within the cognitive (or 
economic) dimension, as opposed to affective (or relational) dimension (Dirks, Lewicki, and 
Zaheer, 2009). Although the affective dimension is undeniably important, it is hard to address 
both dimensions in one single research. There are several reasons why cognitive dimension is 
chosen. First, it represents the rational and calculative aspect of relationship, which is in line with 
the nature of work relationships that is most commonly seen in business environment where the 
level of interaction tends to be shallow and economic. Second, the calculus-based relationship is 
the first stage in trust building process (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996), and studying this cognitive 
dimension can serve as ground of future research when digging deeper into trust relationships 
that are well-developed. 
Trust is "the willingness o f a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the 
positive expectations of the other party's action" (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 1995; 
Rousseau et al., 1998). As trust brings vulnerability, unavoidably it may sometimes be exploited 
and the positive expectations in trust are unmet. This is when a trust violation occurs. 
Accordingly, trust repair is when trust level is positively changed after violation (Dirks, Lewicki, 
and Zaheer, 2009). Meanwhile, trust is operationalized from a behavioral tradition as "an 
expectancy of positive (or nonnegative) outcomes that one can receive based on the expected 
action of another party in an interaction characterized by uncertainty" (Bhattacharya, Devinney, 
and Pillutla, 1998，p. 462). 
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Commitment is the force that keeps individuals in a relationship or a consistent line of behavior, 
and continuance commitment represents the cognitive component of commitment that is 
introduced by “side bets” based on economic rationale (Meyer and Allen, 1984). As side bet can 
be high investment size or low quality of alternative, continuance commitment is sub-
dimensioned by these two aspects (McGee and Ford, 1987). Investment size constitutes 
continuance commitment because high investment would be wasted i f individual discontinues 
the relationship and increases the cost of leaving. Quality of alternatives also represents 
continuance commitment such that when alternative is poor, the individual is "stuck" in the 
relationship because there is no better choice. 
As commitment (or continuance commitment) is by definition a force that keeps individuals 
preserve a certain relationship, it is reasonable to assume a similar effect in trust relationship 
during trust violation and repair procedure. Therefore, the research question I want to address in 
this thesis is whether and how continuance commitment influence trust level in trust violation 
and trust repair. Introducing commitment as a new perspective to look at trust rebuilding process 
is meaningful it emphasizes victim's influence and the importance of contextual factors, which 
are less addressed in previous research (e.g., Williams, 2001). 
Specifically, it is hypothesized that when individual experiences trust violation, continuance 
commitment would play as a "buffer" to alleviate the damage of trust decline, which decreases 
the intention to leave the relationship. And when trust is being repaired by violator's reparative 
behavior (such as consistently behave in a trustworthy way), continuance commitment would 
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enhance the effectiveness of trust repair so that trust level would pick up faster after violation, 
which increases the intention to stay in the relationship. Both sub-dimensions are believed to 
have a similar impact on trust violation and repair process. In order to test these propositions, 
two laboratory experiments of 2x2 between-subjects repeated trust game were conducted. In 
each of the experiments, participants were told to play a two-player trust game for several rounds 
on computer with their partners connected via internet, but actually the partners were 
confederates achieved by software program and were pre-designed to exploit trust (trust violation) 
and then consistently behave trustworthily (trust repair). Participants were randomly assigned to 
different investment (high/low) and alternative (high/low) conditions and their trust levels were 
measured repeatedly for each round. A repeated measures analysis was then conducted to 
compare the trust development among different groups during violation stage and repair stage 
respectively to test proposed hypotheses. 
This study is aimed at moving forward current research both theoretically and methodologically. 
As previous researches tend to focus more on the "active" side and advice on different reparative 
tactics，comparatively less is done on the "passive" side of trust repair such as contextual factors 
that may also influence trust repair effectiveness. Therefore, by introducing commitment as a 
contextual factor, I intend to draw attention to this new and meaningful perspective to expand 
our understanding on trust repair. Meanwhile, in terms of methodology, this study employs a 
repeated measures design and examines the interaction of between-person-level factor 
(continuance commitment) and within-person-level factor (trust development) to see i f different 
commitment level would lead to different trust violation or trust repair patterns. This analytical 
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method may potentially be a useful tool for trust researchers who are also interested in studying 
the multi-level difference of trust dynamics within individuals. 
In the following part of thesis, a literature review is first presented on trust, trust repair, 
commitment, and continuance commitment to serve as a background of further discussion. In the 
chapter that follows, hypotheses are proposed upon the understanding of literature. And chapter 
four would introduce the methodology of current study, along with details of experimental 
design in two experiments. Chapter five reports the results yielded from these two studies, and 
the last chapter discusses limitations and contributions of the present research. 
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2 Theoretical Background 
2.1 Trust 
Trust 
Trust is conceptualized differently across disciplines such as economics (Williamson, 1993; 
Craswell, 1993), sociology (Gambetta, 1988), and psychology (Rotter, 1971). Across various 
conceptualizations, two common elements of trust are widely acknowledged: a) a positive 
expectation on the trusted party, and b) a willingness to be vulnerable in the face of risk 
(Rousseau et al., 1998). Rousseau et al. (1998, p. 395) offered an interdisciplinary definition of 
interpersonal trust that "trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another". A 
similar conceptualization is offered by Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995, p. 712), which 
defined trust from a risk-taking perspective that trust is "the willingness of a party to be 
vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other wi l l perform a 
particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that 
other party." In this study, positive expectation and vulnerability are also recognized as two key 
elements are in trust and it is conceptualized as the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the 
actions of another party based on the positive expectations of the other party's action. 
It is also necessary to clarify about the type of trust this study focuses on. Researchers widely 
agree that trust has different dimensions in terms of origin (McAllister, 1995; Rousseau et al. 
1998; Lewicki，Tomlinson, and Gillespie, 2006). For example, McAllister (1995) established that 
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interpersonal trust has two forms - "cognition-based trust, grounded in individual beliefs about 
peer reliability and dependability, and affect-based trust, grounded in reciprocated interpersonal 
care and concern" (p. 25). 
Similarly, Rousseau et al. (1998) mentioned calculus-based and relational trust as two different 
forms of trust. According to their argument, calculus-based trust is rational choice in economic 
exchange that is based on a positive perception of the other party's intention to act beneficially. 
Relational trust, which is close to affective trust proposed by McAllister (1995), is comparatively 
more a "people" trust as it involves emotion and affects. Although many other types of trust 
have been proposed, the distinction between cognitive trust and affective trust is most commonly 
accepted and discussed. 
In Lewicki，Tomlinson, and Gillespie's review (2006), they concluded that there are two 
different traditions in trust research. The behavioral tradition views trust as rational-choice 
behavior such as cooperative decisions in game (Williamson, 1981; Hardin, 1993), and the 
psychological tradition involves "complex intrapersonal states, including expectations, intentions, 
affect, and dispositions" (Lewicki, Tomlinson, and Gillespie, 2006, p.992). I also agree with this 
typology and recognize the worthiness to study each type of trust. However, as discussed before, 
cognitive dimension mostly evokes economic rational, behavioral trust is more relevant to the 
research question at hand and therefore particularly selected to looked at. 
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From the behavioral approach, trust can be described as "an expectancy of positive (or 
nonnegative) outcomes that one can receive based on the expected action of another party in an 
interaction characterized by uncertainty" (Bhattacharya, Devinney, and Pillutla, 1998, p. 462). 
This conceptualization, other than acknowledging the two key elements of trust (positive 
expectation and vulnerability), is particularly helpful in understanding calculative trust as it 
assumes that individuals are "expected util ity maximizers" (p. 465). Given that continuance 
commitment is also rationally based, this definition is a good match and well serves the research 
question at hand. Hence, this definition of trust (Bhattacharya, Devinney, and Pillutla, 1998) is 
adapted as an operationalization of trust. 
Trust Repair 
The topic of trust repair receives growing attention in the recent decade (Dirks, Lewicki, and 
Zaheer, 2009). As interpersonal trust depends on the fulfillment, or a series of consistent 
fulfillments, of the positive expectation of an individual (trustor) towards another party (trustee), 
trust can be violated when expectation is unmet and a trust violation (sometimes referred to as 
transgression or breach) occurs. Failing to ful f i l l trust expectations may cause serious problems 
such as negative affects (Chen, Saparito, and Belkin, 2011), termination of cooperation (Bottom 
et al., 2002)，and revenge (Bies and Tripp, 1996; Bradfield and Aquino, 1999). For many reasons 
that are not limited to those above, violators would find themselves in a diff icult and challenging 
situation to restore relationship with violation victims. Despite the fragility o f trust, it is of great 
importance to repair firstly because dissolution of a beneficial trust relationship would cause 
economic loss unless it is successfully reestablished (Mumighan, 1981). Meanwhile, in some 
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circumstances it is not only the violators but also the victims who want to repair broken trust 
(Kim，Dirks, and Cooper, 2009) for the sake of potential joint benefit. In brief, trust repair is an 
issue worth consideration. 
Researchers have referred to trust repair differently in terms of what kind o f trust is being 
repaired (Dirks, Lewicki, and Zaheer, 2009). It might be concluded from various studies that 
trust repair involves restoration in at least three aspects— attitudinal trust, behavioral trust, and 
affective trust. For example, some researchers focus on how trust perceptions can be positively 
influenced after trust violation (e.g., K im et a l , 2004; K im et al” 2006), some examine the 
restoration of cooperation or positive affect (Bottom et al, 2002), while others extend to the 
rebuilding of both attitudinal trust and behaviors of risk-taking (e.g., Schweitzer, Hershey, and 
Bradlow, 2006; Dirks et al., 2011). Usually the target of trust repair is dependent on the specific 
research questions at hand and has no uniform standard. In this thesis, behavioral trust w i l l be 
particularly focused because it is directly related to the rational and economic decisions 
represented by risk-taking behaviors, as opposed to attitudinal trust that involves more complex 
antecedents (Rousseau et al., 1998). 
One may also question the magnitude of trust repair - do we need trust to be fully recovered to 
its original level in order to say that trust has been "repaired"? Most current literature does not 
employ such strict definition of trust repair (e.g., K im et al” 2004, 2006; Ferrin et al., 2007; 
Schweitzer, Hershey, and Bradlow, 2006; Dirks et al., 2011). Instead, trust repair is more loosely 
defined as “new or changed cognitions about the actor by the victim, more positive (or less 
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negative) affective disposition toward the actor, more positive intentions to trust the other in 
future exchanges, and expectations of more productive exchanges within the specific facet o f the 
interpersonal relationship" (Dirks, Lewicki, and Zaheer, 2009, p. 78). Simply put, trust repair 
occurs when some improvements occur, no matter what magnitude. Additionally, for 
clarification purpose I would use trust restoration to represent the circumstance where trust is 
fully repaired in this thesis. 
Perspectives of Trust Repair Research 
Studies on interpersonal trust repair employ a range of theoretical lenses, and in the following 
part I would briefly review the most commonly found perspectives including bilateral, dynamic, 
attributional, and contingent view on trust repair. 
Trust repair is believed to be a bilateral process in which both trustor and trustee are involved 
and have influence on trust repair. Kim, Dirks, and Cooper (2009) theorized this argument under 
the assumptions that trustees want to be considered trustworthy, trustors believe otherwise, and 
the two parties go through negotiation to resolve this discrepancy. They provided a bilateral 
model in which outcome of trust repair is the result of negotiation on trustees' trustworthiness 
between violators' efforts to repair trust and victims' efforts to resist such attempts. For example, 
i f the trustee tries hard to restore trustworthiness and the trustor is open to this redemption, trust 
can be repaired effectively, and yet when trustee's attempt is weak while trustor's resistance is 
strong，mistrust is confirmed and trust repair is hardly possible. Meanwhile, i f both parties hold 
strong efforts, there should be a forceful confrontation, and i f both parties are weak, a situation 
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of avoidance might occur. In brief, it is argued that trust repair depends on the strength of the 
trustees' efforts to rebuild a trustworthy perception and whether it outweighs the opposing efforts 
of trustors. 
Other trust repair studies, although not explicitly specified, also agrees with the bilateral 
negotiation perspective. For instance, Tomlinson, Dineen, and Lewicki (2004) acknowledged 
trustor's resistance by examining antecedents of victim's willingness to reconcile in a 
professional relationship where promise is broken. A number of research discussed the 
effectiveness of trust repair tactics (e.g., K im et al, 2004; K im et al, 2006), which implies the 
recognition of trustor's efforts on restoring trustworthiness. 
Attribution is frequently used to describe trust repair process. For example, Tomlinson and 
Mayer (2009) suggest a causal attribution model of trust repair that describes how victims make 
causal attributions in a cognitive sense-making process and decide the trustworthiness perception 
of the trustee. Also from the attribution perspective, Chan (2009) offers an attribution-based 
typology of betrayal in which betrayal can be incidental or intentional, and incidental betrayal 
can be egoistic or ideological while intentional betrayal can be personalistic or reciprocal. 
Different types of betrayal may lead to different attributions and hence need different reparative 
tactics to repair. For instance, Chan proposed that i f the victim attribute the violation to be 
incidental and egoistic (i.e., the violator is not aware that his/her behavior out of self-interest w i l l 
harm the victim), apology and restitution might be suitable. However, i f the violation is 
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attributed as intentionally personal (i.e.，violator's intention is to harm the victim), no reparative 
tactics would be effective. 
Kim, Dirks, and Cooper (2009), along with the bilateral conceptualization, also suggested from a 
dynamic and attributional perspective that the negotiation between trustor and trustee is a 
dynamic progress and proposed a multilevel model of how trust repair may be pursued. They 
described victims' cognitive attribution as a three-level process, in which victims first decide 
whether trustees are guilty or innocent, and then, i f guilty, is it attributable to situation or to 
person. Finally, i f internal attribution is made, victims decide whether this situation is fixable or 
fixed. 
Studies from a contingent view found that trust repair is dependent on various external factors. 
For example, the effectiveness o f reparative tactics is found to be contingent on the nature o f 
trust violation of whether the violation is competence-based or integrity-based (Kim et al” 2004). 
Characteristics of trust relationship such as past relationship and probability of future violation 
are found to influence victim's willingness to reconcile (Tomlinson, Dineen, and Lewicki, 2004). 
Some other perspectives are mentioned in trust repair. Ren and Gary (2009) promote a cultural 
trust repair model and suggest that effective relationship restoration results from an interaction o f 
the disputants' cultures, the violation type, and the type of restoration mechanism offered. Chen, 
Saparito, and Belkin (2011), from an affective perspective, conceptualized the mediating role of 
specific emotions in trust breach and trust erosions. 
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In this thesis, a bilateral and contingent view is taken such that victims' negotiation power in 
bilateral progress is deemed to be dependent on their continuance commitment in the trust 
relationship. Specifically, I fol low the bilateral perspective and address more on the victim side 
to examine the resistance or openness on trust repair, and integrate it with contingent view to see 
i f the contextual factor, continuance commitment, is predictive of trust repair. 
Trust Repair Effectiveness 
Given its fragility, trust is violated easily but much more diff icult to repair, and researchers have 
reported a growing amount of empirical studies on how to repair trust effectively. A number of 
research discussed different reparative attempts and the effectiveness under different situations. 
Although the current study is less interested in answering which tactics are most effective, the 
research in this area is briefly reviewed given its influence on the topic of trust repair. 
The most discussed pair of repair tactics is apology and denial (e.g.. Bottom et al., 2002; K im et 
al” 2004; Tomlinson, Dineen, and Lewicki 2004; K im et al” 2006; Schweitzer, Hershey, and 
Bradlow，2006; Ferrin et al. 2007), and the results seem to be mixed and situation-dependent. 
While some researchers found that apology has a positive role in trust repair (Bottom, et al., 
2002; Tomlinson, Dineen, and Lewicki 2004), others reported a nonsignificant effect 
(Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow，2006). Effect o f denial is also mixed (Kim et al., 2004; K im et 
al., 2006; Ferrin et al., 2007; Bottom et al., 2002). Researchers also have different answers on the 
question of whether denial or apology has a better reparative power. Bottom et al. (2002) 
predicted a positive effect of denial but results showed that denial or acknowledgement ofnon-
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cooperative intent does not make a difference. K im and his colleagues (2004，2006, 2007) 
believed that the answer depends on situations. In their three empirical findings results 
consistently show that apology is better for competence-based violation while denial is better for 
integrity-based violation. 
Another group o f widely discussed tactics are internal and external attributions. K i m et al. (2004， 
2006; Ferrin et a l ” 2007) found that internal attribution works better for competence-based 
violation, while external attribution works better for integrity-based violation. Tomlinson, 
Dineen, and Lewicki (2004) found that an apology using internal attribution, compared to one 
using external attribution, was more effective in enhancing the victim's willingness to reconcile. 
Several other tactics are also proposed and tested. Bottom et al. (2002) predicted and empirically 
proved that substantive amends have a significant reparative effect, regardless o f the actual 
amount o f amend. Nakayachi and Watabe (2005) found that organization's voluntary hostage 
posting after adverse events has a signaling effect and raise public's perceptions of 
trustworthiness as well as behaviors. Schweitzer, Hershey, and Bradlow (2006) suggested that 
trust can be effectively restored when individuals observe a consistent series o f trustworthy 
actions, and promise is found to accelerate the process. Tomlinson, Dineen, and Lewicki (2004) 
showed that the timeliness and sincerity o f violator's reparative attempts are positively related to 
a willingness to reconcile the relationship. 
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Characteristics o f the relationship are recognized to moderate trust repair effectiveness in some 
studies. For example, Bottom et al. (2002) found that acknowledgment of non-cooperative intent, 
compared to denial, is more effective when cooperation history is short. Tomlinson, Dineen, and 
Lewicki (2004) found that a good past relationship and a low probability o f a future violation are 
positively related to victim's willingness to reconcile. 
From the review of existing literature on trust repair, one may observe that researchers on this 
topic tend to emphasize on the "active" side of repair and try to find effective methods to 
actively repair trust from violator's point. And yet according to the bilateral argument (Kim, 
Dirks，and Cooper, 2009), victims also have significant impacts as their resistance (or openness) 
to trust repair equally determine the effectiveness of trust repair. Meanwhile, the contextual view 
(Tomlinson, Dineen, and Lewicki, 2004) reasonably raises attention on contextual factors that 
"passively" influence trust repair. In this thesis, I agree with their arguments and introduce 
victim's continuance commitment as a contextual factor on victim's side and argue that victim's 
continuance commitment would influence trust violation and trust repair respectively. 
2.2 Commitment 
Commitment 
Commitment widely exists in interpersonal relationships (Becker, 1960), intimate relationships 
(Rusbult and Buunk, 1993), and organizational relationships (Meyer and Allen, 1984). In broad 
terms, it describes the psychological state that people "engage in a consistent line of behavior" 
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(Becker, 1960，p. 33). For instance, organizational commitment is individual's commitment to an 
organization or job position such as maintenance o f organizational membership, while 
commitment in social psychology is mostly towards interpersonal relationship or close 
relationships such as preservation o f romantic partnership. The concept o f "consistent line o f 
activity" can represent different behaviors in different relationships. For example, when talking 
about commitment to the organization, the consistent line of activity means maintaining 
membership in the organization (Meyer and Allen, 1984). And in a cooperative relationship, the 
consistent line o f activity refers to continuing to cooperate. Meanwhile, this consistent line o f 
behavior is context-specific (i.e., the commitment level to the same other party w i l l change when 
the situation changes in the relationship). Therefore, the target o f continuance commitment is the 
relationship rather than the other party per se. Although commitment is conceptualized 
differently across disciplines, in the present study commitment is not specific on the nature o f 
context but generally defined as a broad concept that may be applied to many kinds o f 
relationships. 
Most researchers would agree that commitment is a construct with multiple foci (Meyer and 
Allen，1984; Reichers, 1985; Mathieu and Zajac，1990; Al len and Meyer, 1996). Attitudinal 
commitment, or affective commitment, refers to an individual's identification to a relationship 
and suggests that commitment originates from a congruence o f goal and value. It contains three 
factors: a strong belief in and acceptance of the goals and values o f the other party, a willingness 
to exert considerable effort on behalf of the other party, and a strong desire to maintain the 
relationship (Mowday et al” 1982). Continuance commitment, or calculative commitment, is 
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built upon Becker's side-bet theory and defined as "a structural phenomenon which occurs as a 
result o f . . . transactions and alterations in side-bets or investments over time" (Hrebiniak and 
Alutto, 1972, p. 556). It regards commitment as a function of the reward and costs associated 
with staying in a consistent line of behavior (Becker, 1960; Rusbult and Farrell, 1983; Hrebiniak 
and Alutto, 1972). Normative commitment describes a moral obligation to remain in a 
relationship because individuals believe it is the right thing to do. These three components of 
commitment, under Meyer and Allen's conceptualization (1991), can be summarized that 
affective commitment means the desire to stay, continuance commitment represents the need to 
stay, and normative commitment is the obligation to stay. Other than the three-component 
conceptualization of commitment, an attributional perspective of commitment is also identified, 
which conceptualizes commitment as a binding of the individual to behavioral acts that results 
when individuals attribute an attitude of commitment to themselves after engaging in behaviors 
that are volitional, explicit, and irrevocable. 
As the present study employs a cognitive perspective, continuance commitment is of primary 
interest and the following chapter wi l l review the concept of continuance commitment as well as 
its consequences and sub-dimensions to serve as a basis of future discussion. 
Continuance Commitment and Side Bet Theory 
As mentioned before, continuance commitment sees commitment as a calculative and behavioral 
binding based on individual's recognition of the costs associated with discontinuing the action. 
Originated from the side bet theory (Becker, 1960), this behavioral commitment is more 
17 
interested in the accumulation of side bets or sunk cost, as it sees commitment as a function of 
the reward and cost associated with staying or leaving the relationship. Such conceptualization is 
in line with many previous studies. For example, Kanter (1968) labels it "cognitive-continuance 
commitment" that occurs when there is a "profit associated with continued participation and a 
‘cost，associated with leaving" (p. 504). And Stebbins (1970) defines continuance commitment 
as "the immense penalties involved in making the switch" (p. 527). Although with minor 
differences, these conceptualizations all recognize commitment as a calculative component 
associated with benefits and costs that wi l l occur i f the action is discontinued. The following part 
of this session would introduce how the construct of continuance commitment gradually emerges 
and become established with the development of side-bet theory. 
In Becker's (1960) original work of side-bet theory, he suggests that commitment emerges 
"when a person, by making a side bet, links extraneous interests with a consistent line of 
activity" (p. 32) .He also gives an example to illustrate how side-bet is related to commitment. 
Suppose one is bargaining to buy a house with an offer of sixteen thousand dollars, whereas the 
seller insists on at least twenty thousand dollars. I f this person has bet a third party five thousand 
dollars that he wi l l not pay more than sixteen thousand dollars for the house, he w i l l not pay 
more than sixteen thousand dollars because he has committed himself to the original offer by 
making a side-bet with a third party. Becker suggests that such linkage of extraneous interest to 
the action wi l l increase consistency in behavior, or in other words increase commitment to the 
present behavior. 
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Becker further specifies three elements in such commitment that is introduced by side-bets. First, 
the individual is in a position in which his decision of whether to continue a certain line of action 
wi l l influence extraneous interests that are originally not necessarily related to this behavior. 
Second, this situation is caused by his own prior actions, although he may not be aware of it until 
confronted with an important decision. Third, the individual must be aware of such side bet and 
must recognize that his decision wi l l have an impact on extraneous interests that is brought in by 
this side bet. 
According to Becker, side bets are not necessarily consciously and deliberately made. Instead, 
Becker suggests four social processes that can bring such side bets without individuals' 
conscious actions. First, generalized cultural expectations may introduce side bets in a way it 
provides penalties for those who violate them. For example, in a culture where loyalty is strongly 
emphasized, an individual may stay in a relationship because he does not want others to see him 
as unreliable and untrustworthy. Second, the operation of impersonal bureaucratic arrangements 
can make side bets for individual. Take organizational commitment for instance, i f changing job 
wi l l cause a significant lose in pension fund with previous employer, an employee may stick to 
the current job in order to lose of pension fund. In the first two situations, although side bets are 
not made by the committed individual in an explicit way, side bets are still made by this 
individual ---- in his acquiescence to the system and his acceptance to the rules. Third, side bets 
also come from individual adjustment to social positions. By adjusting oneself to the current 
position, an individual has increased side bets because staying in the same line of action becomes 
easier while discontinuing the behavior becomes more difficult. The fourth cause of side bets, 
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according to Becker, is face-to-face interaction. Explicit claims of conducting a certain behavior 
adds side bets in a way that people need to ful f i l l those claims in order to maintain a reliable 
image and "save face". 
Side bet theory is further developed in the several decades after its proposition, especially in the 
field o f organizational commitment. The history of this theory is worthwhile to look at because it 
helps us to understand and clarify about the underlying meaning of side bet and continuance 
commitment. 
Early studies use tenure and age as proxy o f side bets in organization because they believe side 
bets accumulate over time and these variables reflect side bet commitment on the assumption 
that the number and magnitude of side bets generally increase over time. (Allutto, Hrebiniak，and 
Alonso, 1973). Indicators o f side-bet are later expanded to education, pay, gender, mobility, 
organizational level, marital status, number of children, and perceived job alternatives (Allutto, 
Hrebiniak, and Alonso, 1973). Results o f these studies have been mixed as sometimes empirical 
evidences were supportive but sometimes not. Studies upon this stage were still immature in that 
literature is more a ‘laundry list' o f significant antecedent of correlated variables" (Reichers, 
1985，p. 467) and the mixed results were hard to interpret even i f they were consistent (Meyer 
and Allen, 1991). 
Other than using these proxies, early studies also use instruments developed by Ritzer and Trice 
(1969)，modified by Hrebiniak and Alutto (1972) to measure commitment. These two scales 
20 
both ask respondents to indicate the likelihood that they would leave their organization given 
various inducements. But empirical studies that fol low this methodology often yield mixed 
results. Ritzer and Trice (1969) found no relationship between organizational commitment and 
most of the side-bed indexes. They therefore rejected the side-bet explanation of commitment, 
and offered an alternative theory that interprets organizational commitment from a social 
psychological perspective. In contrast to Ritzer and Trice's (1969) finding, Alutto, Hrebiniak, 
and Alonso (1973), after modifying the scale, found positive and significant relationships 
between organizational commitment and most of the side-bet indexes. Shoemaker, Snizek, and 
Bryant (1977) tested both side-bet theory by Becker and social psychological theory by Ritzer 
and Trice (1969) in organizational and occupational commitment. Their result shows that both 
theories have certain explanatory power, and yet social psychological factors have stronger effect 
than side bet indices. 
These mixed results brought much debate between attitudinal commitment and continuance 
commitment. Later, researchers began to acknowledge the existence of both and realized that the 
mixed empirical support for side-bet view of commitment was probably due to inappropriate 
measures of commitment rather than a theoretical flaw (Stebbins, 1970; Meyer and Allen, 1984; 
Wallace，1997). Stebbins (1970) argued that the original scale operationalized commitment as 
value commitment rather than continuance commitment, and therefore Ritzer and Trice's study 
was clearly not within the scope of side-bet theory of commitment. Wallace (1997) reached the 
same conclusion in a study among 1155 lawyers in Canada. The results of early side-bet 
measures do not adequately test Becker's theory probably because of the fact that Becker did not 
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explicitly define side-bet related commitment in his original work. Wallace suggests that instead 
of rejecting side-bet theory of commitment, it is the measures that lack validity to tap 
continuance commitment. 
Similarly, Meyer and Allen (1984) hold the same view that previous scales are dealing with 
affective commitment instead of continuance commitment. They distinguish attitudinal-
attachment-related commitment and side-bet related commitment and developed two scales that 
measure these two commitments respectively. Meanwhile, in order to justify their arguments and 
validate the two scales, Meyer and Al len carried out an experiment, in which they manipulated 
affective commitment and continuance commitment respectively and asked participants to 
respond to previous scales, Organizational Commitment Questionnaire (which clearly measures 
affective commitment), and their self-developed affective commitment scale and continuance 
commitment scale. Results support the argument that previous scales are tapping more on 
affective commitment than on continuance commitment because continuance commitment 
manipulation accounted for a relatively small portion of the variance in the scores o f the previous 
scales，while affective commitment manipulation accounted for a substantially larger portion. 
Upon this point, researchers reached consensus that early mixed results on continuance 
commitment is due to the problem of operationalization rather than the theory itself. Continuance 
commitment is comparatively well-established and widely accepted as a component of 
commitment that represents calculative and substantial motives of why individuals remain in a 
relationship (Cohen and Lowenberg,1990). In brief, studies based on side bet theory argue that 
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continuation of an action results from recognition of these costs associated with termination of 
relationship, and this cognitive state is labeled as continuance commitment. 
Consequences of Continuance Commitment 
As the construct of continuance commitment develops, researchers gradually identify its related 
consequences. First of all, as commitment is by definition negatively related to the tendency of 
withdrawal, it is quit straightforward to expect a large amount of empirical evidences supporting 
this prediction. Continuance commitment has been found to increase the resilience in a 
relationship by decreasing the possibility of withdrawal. For example, employee's continuance 
commitment to organization is found to negatively relate to turnover intentions and turnover (e.g., 
Whitener and Walz, 1993), and women's commitment to partner is negatively related to leaving 
behavior in abusive relationships (Rusbult and Martz, 1995). 
Continuance commitment is also found to relate to individual's response to dissatisfaction that 
individuals tend to passively neglect dissatisfaction i f continuance commitment is high (Meyer, 
Allen, and Smith, 1993). 
Researchers have made efforts to understand why continuance commitment keeps people in a 
relationship. Johnson and Rusbult (1989) offered an explanation that people tend to devaluate the 
quality of alternatives as a means to maintain romantic relationship. In their longitudinal study, 
perceived quality of alternatives was found to decrease over time among those who stayed but 
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increase for those who left. The same conclusion was drawn from the two experiments in their 
study that highly committed individuals tended to devaluate alternatives. 
Sub-dimensions of Continuance Commitment 
Researchers in continuance commitment have made efforts to identify the sub-dimensions of 
continuance commitment after the construct is proposed. As continuance commitment reflects 
the reward and cost in persistency of an action, it is quite straightforward that "reward" and 
"cost" would influence continuance commitment. Previous investment size is the sunk cost that 
wi l l be lost i f the relationship is terminated. And quality of alternatives is compared against the 
utility of current relationship to determine on the relative attractiveness of leaving or staying. 
Continuance commitment might be reflect a high investment size or low quality o f alternatives 
(Allen and Meyer, 1990). Therefore, many studies in this field have proposed and testified that 
continuance commitment, due to low quality o f alternative or high investment, w i l l be lost i f the 
individual decides to discontinue the behavior (Meyer et al•，1993). 
While alternative is comparatively easy to understand, the concept of investment might require 
some clarification before further elaboration. Investment, sometimes referred to as side bet, 
represents the cost associated with discontinuing an action. It is "anything o f value the individual 
has invested (e.g., time, effort, money) that would be lost or deemed worthless at some perceived 
cost to the individual" (Meyer and Allen, 1984, p. 373) i f a consistent line of behavior is 
discontinued. In the case of organizational commitment, for example, “a side bet is made when 
something of importance to an individual becomes contingent upon continued employment in 
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that organization" (Meyer and Allen, 1991，p. 64), and investments might include contributions 
to non-vested pension plans, development o f organization-specific skills or status, use o f 
organizational benefits such as reduced mortgage rate (Meyer and Allen, 1984), or anything 
individual invested in the organization and cannot “afford” to separate themselves from (Mathieu 
and Zajac, 1990). 
Investment and alternative are implied as two sub-dimensions in Meyer and Allen's work (1984) 
where the term "continuance commitment" is proposed and differentiated from "affective 
commitment". In their experimental study, they manipulated subjects' perception o f continuance 
commitment "by providing information about the investments (side bets) the individual had 
accumulated and the extent to which he perceived alternatives in his present job" (p. 374). And 
such manipulation indicates their assumption that continuance commitment is strengthened by 
increasing investment size or decreasing quality of alternatives. 
Following Meyer and Allen's (1984) work on affective and continuance commitment, McGee 
and Ford (1987) tested the dimensionality of affective and continuance commitments using 
Meyer and Allen's commitment scale. Factor analysis reveals that affective commitment is a 
unidimensional construct while continuance commitment have two distinct dimensions, one is 
available alternative and the other is the sacrifices associated with discontinuance. McGee and 
Ford (1987) also suggested that the second aspect, individual sacrifice, appears to be more 
closely related to the commitment under side bet perspective. 
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Other than the implication under various operationalization of continuance commitment, 
investment and alternative are also considered explicitly as sub-dimensions of continuance 
commitment (Meyer and Allen, 1991). They argued that continuance commitment is increased 
by anything that increases the cost associated with discontinuing the action. As high investment 
refers to the cost of discontinuance while low alternative refers to the lack o f reward after leaving, 
both factors are either sunk cost or opportunity cost that encourages persistency. This argument 
is supported by many empirical studies (e.g., Meyer et al., 1990; Hackett, Bycio, and Hausdorf, 
1994) 
Other than research specifically interested in continuance commitment, investment and 
alternative are also recognized as sub-dimensions of commitment in other research streams. For 
example, Rusbult (1980), under the context of interpersonal commitment in close relationships, 
proposed an investment model of commitment in which investment size and quality of 
alternatives are included as predictors of commitment. Based on investment model (Kelley and 
Thibaut, 1978), the effect o f investment and alternative is further testified in various contexts 
such as interpersonal relationships (e.g., Rusbult and Martz, 1995; Rusbult, Martz, and Agnew, 
1998), job commitment (e.g., Rusbult and Farell, 1983)，business interactions (Ping, 1993, 1997), 
commitment to one's residential community (Lyons, Lowery, 1989), patients' adherence to a 
medical regimen (Putnam et al., 1994), college students' commitment to their school (Geyer, 
Brannon, and Shearon, 1987), and commitment to participating in musical activities (Koslowsky 
and Kluger, 1986). 
26 
In conclusion, continuance commitment is a comparatively well-established factor that 
influences the strength o f relationship and individuals' reaction in face of turbulence. Such effect 
has been found under many contexts in relationships with different nature. However, the 
importance of continuance commitment is not explicitly discussed in trust repair despite the 
potential influence. Introducing the perspective of commitment is meaningful to deepen our 
understanding in trust repair. Meanwhile, applying this theory on trust may also contribute to 
commitment literature as it expands the external validity of continuance commitment to trust 
relationship which has not been established before. 
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3 Hypothesis 
This study introduces continuance commitment as a contextual factor of trust relationship and 
tries to identify its impact on trust violation and trust repair. Continuance commitment is the 
behavior tendency to remain in the relationship based on recognition of costs associated with 
discontinuing the relationship (Meyer and Allen, 1984). Investment size and quality of 
alternative have been identified as two sub-dimensions of continuance commitment. Investment, 
or side bet, is regarded as a cost because the investment would be lost or deemed worthless i f the 
relationship or action is discontinued. Alternative is the potential reward an individual may 
receive by switching to another relationship or action. It is an opportunity cost and influences 
commitment in a way that when alternative is attractive, the opportunity cost is high and 
therefore commitment is low. Under this perspective of continuance commitment, the current 
study is aimed at understanding how commitment level influence the trust violation and trust 
repair procedure. 
A basic assumption underlying this research question is that trust indeed can be repaired and the 
reparative tactic employed in this study would be effective because otherwise there would be no 
trust repair, not to mention the influence of commitment in trust repair. Therefore, this 
assumption must be established before going deeper to directly address the main interest of the 
research question at hand. 
Although many empirical evidences supported that trust can be repaired, discussions on 
reparative tactics have not reached consensus. In order to improve victim's perceived 
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trustworthiness towards violator, researchers have proposed several useful tactics such as 
apology, promise, monetary penance (Tomlinson, Dineen, and Lewicki, 2004; K im et al., 2004, 
2006; Ferrin et al., 2007; Dirks et al., 2011). I use the reparative tactic of consistent trustworthy 
behaviors for the fol lowing reasons. First o f all, as trust is built on the accumulation of perceived 
trustworthiness (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 1995), it is reasonable to assume a similar 
situation in trust rebuilding such that accumulation of reinforcement on observed consistency in 
trustworthy behaviors would increase victim's confidence on their partners. Observable 
trustworthy behavior can accumulate perception of trustworthiness in trust repair. Meanwhile, 
among all the reparative tactics proposed in existing literature, consistent trustworthy behavior 
might be the most fundamental one as other reparative tactics wi l l lose effect as soon as another 
violation occurs. No reparative tactic can stand alone unless accompanied by observable 
trustworthy behavior in future interactions just like promises may be regarded as cheap talk 
(Schweitzer, Hershey, and Bradlow，2006). Moreover, in the current thesis I am not especially 
interested in studying the effectiveness of different reparative tactics, and using this tactic is 
simple and most appropriate for the research question concerned because many other tactics are 
sensitive to violation type (e.g., K im et al, 2004). Consistent trustworthy behavior is 
hypothesized to foster trust repair that following a consistent line of trustworthy behavior, 
victim's perception on trustworthiness of the violator wi l l improve and trust level would increase 
within time. 
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H I Compared to trust level immediately after violation, victim's trust for the violator is 
significantly higher after some interactions where the violator consistently behaves in a 
trustworthy way. 
When trust expectations confront untrustworthy behavior, the trust is violated and trustor 
becomes a victim of such violation. I f such violation is attributed to the trustworthiness of 
violator, it is unavoidable that trust level towards this violator would decrease, and the extent o f 
decrease should correspond to the perceived severity of violation. As commitment is the 
tendency to stay in a consistent line of behavior (Becker, 1960), it is found to serve as a "buffer" 
when the relationship experiences turbulence (Meyer et al., 1993). As continuance commitment 
makes victim unwill ing to terminate the relationship, it would buffer trust violation such that 
victims would employ many cognitive adjustments and solve the conflict between unmet trust 
expectation and involuntary commitment. This buffering effect may occur in the following ways. 
First, as found by Meyer et al. (1993), individuals with high commitment tend to neglect 
dissatisfying situations such as trust violations. By overlooking the unmet expectation of trustee, 
the negative effect of violation is alleviated so that committed victims would solve the 
dissonance between trust expectation and partner's untrustworthy behavior (Festinger, 1957). 
Second, continuance commitment is found to positively relate to devaluation of alternatives 
(Johnson and Rusbult, 1989)，which might serve as an explanation how individuals of high 
commitment adjust themselves to a dissatisfying relationship. Similarly, in order to solve the 
conflict between unmet trust and involuntary commitment, victims of trust violation would 
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employ various means towards cognitive adaptation. Further still, other than neglecting partner's 
untrustworthy behavior and devaluating alternatives, it is also possible that victims may make 
favorable attributions to digest the trust violation (Takaku, 2001). For instance, victims would 
convince themselves that the violation is occasional or unintended and the violator is actually 
innocent or forgivable. In brief, the "buffering" effect of commitment is implied under its 
conceptualization, and such effect has been found in various contexts and we have good reason 
to believe a similar situation in trust relationship. With all the possible ways to adjust cognition 
on the trust violation, victims would perceive the violation as less severe. Continuance 
commitment is supposed to buffer the trust decline in trust violation, and this effect should apply 
to both sub-dimensions (investment and alternative) of continuance commitment. 
H2 Victims with high investment size would experience less decrease in trust level when trust is 
violated. 
H3 Victims with low quality of alternative would experience less decrease in trust level when 
trust is violated 
Just like its buffering effect in trust violation, continuance commitment is supposed to accelerate 
the trust repair procedure and increase individual's intention to maintain a relationship after 
turbulence. Researches on continuance commitment have found this effect on many kinds of 
relationships. For instance, employee's continuance commitment to organization is found to 
negatively relate to turnover intentions and turnover (e.g., Whitener and Walz, 1993), and 
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women's commitment to partner is negatively related to stay/leave behavior in abusive 
relationships (Rusbult and Martz, 1995). As continuance commitment is found to foster positive 
changes in disturbed relationships, it is reasonable to infer a similar effect on trust repair. 
Continuance commitment should accelerate trust repair for several reasons. 
First, similar to the buffering effect on trust violation, the acceleration effect on trust repair might 
be invoked by a cognitive adjustment of dissonance. Committed victims need trust to be 
effectively repaired so that they can trust their partners again and continue with the relationship 
they cannot afford to leave. Such victims would perceive partner's reparative attempts more 
positively and persuade themselves to accept trust repair to a larger extent so as to resolve the 
dissonance between commitment and trust violation (Festinger, 1957). Moreover, empirical 
evidences show that cognitive adjustment does exist in relationship repair. For example, victims 
would make benevolent attributions, experience benevolent emotional reactions, and forgive the 
violator (Takaku, 2001). 
Second, trust grows via risk-taking (Cook et al., 2005) and higher exposure to risk in previous 
interaction would increase trust to a larger extent. In other words, trust grows on the basis of 
previous trust level as an ongoing self-reinforcing process. I f previous trust is high and hence the 
vulnerability is high, trustee's trustworthy response would be enhance trust level to a large extent 
because the trustee withstands an appealing attempt. Comparatively, i f previous trust is low and 
the vulnerability is low, the attempt is less attractive and even i f trustee behaves trustworthily, 
the increase in trust would not be as high as in the previous scenario. Therefore, i f there is only a 
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slight difference on trust level between victims with high commitment and those with low 
commitment, this difference wi l l grow larger like a snowball as the number of times of risk-
taking increases. 
With the above reasons, I suggest that as trust level picks up from trust violation, victims who 
are committed would regain trust faster because trust repair is for their benefit as well. It is also 
reasonable to predict the existence of such effect on both high investment condition and low 
quality of alternative condition as they are both sub-dimensions of continuance commitment. 
H4 Victims' high investment size would enhance victims' trust repair where violator consistently 
behaves in a trustworthy way after trust violation. 
H5 Victims' low quality of alternative would enhance victims' trust repair where violator 
consistently behaves in a trustworthy way after trust violation. 
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4 Study 1 
Study 1 is a repeated measures design with two between-subjects factors and one within-subjects 
factor. In this chapter, I w i l l first explain the game settings and experimental design and then 
analyze the data using repeated measures analysis. The analytical method of repeated measures 
wi l l also be briefly introduced. 
4.1 Experiment Design 
Basic Game Settings 
Game experiment is frequently used in trust research (e.g., Bottom et al. 2002; Schweitzer, 
Hershey, and Bradlow, 2006). A basic assumption in such game design is that cooperation is 
mutually desirable for two parties that are not in direct competition (Bottom et al., 2002). 
Usually the game is set in a way that highest reward can be achieved i f both parties are 
cooperative, and worst payoff happens to the—party that chooses to cooperate i f the other party 
chooses to exploit. A representative example is the investment game (Berg, Dickhaut, and 
McCabe, 1995; Schweitzer, Hershey, and Bradlow, 2006), which is also used in the current 
research. 
In an investment game, two players (player A and player B) are involved. Player A has a certain 
amount of initial capital, which is denoted here a s M . And player A makes an investment 
decision by passing a certain amount of money, represented asM^ • The amount of money passed 
is then increased to several times as much as a mutual fund. I f we assume the multiplier to be «， 
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the money passed should increase XonxM^. Meanwhile, player B decides how to allocate this 
money by deciding a ratio {k,)of which player A receives the mutual fund. The payoff of player 
A is 
Pa 
and payoff of player B is 
Pb =inxM^)-ksX(nxMJ. 
I f I use a scenario of study 1 as an example, the game is like this. Initial capital M i s set to be $10. 
I f a participant decides to pass $7 to the mutual fund, M^ equals to 7. And i f the multiplier n is 
set at 6, the mutual fund equals to n x M ^ = $42. I f player B evenly distributed the mutual fund at 
f i f ty-f ifty, the return ratio k^ is 50%. In such case, player A receives $21 from money passed, 
while player B received the remaining mutual fund which is also $21. However, i f player B 
decides to take all the mutual fund (免办 二 0%), player A receives $0 while player B gets $42. 
It is apparent in the payoff function that player A's outcome is dependent on player B, which 
means player A is taking risks when deciding how much to invest. Therefore, such game setting 
is appropriate to study trust behavior as player A's vulnerability is in line with the nature of trust 
behavior as it also involves risk-taking in a vulnerable position. 
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In the present study, a repeated investment game was adapted (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 
1995; Schweitzer, Hershey, and Bradlow, 2006). This experiment design has several advantages 
that are important to address the research questions in this thesis. First, it can be used to 
investigate trust behavior over time (Schweitzer, Hershey, and Bradlow, 2006) as it involves 
several rounds of trust game and easily captures trust behavior through the series of decisions 
made in the game. Second, it is adequate for studies that start from the perspective of trustor 
(Schweitzer, Hershey, and Bradlow, 2006). As the experiment tests responds of trustor (player 
A), it can accurately capture the changes of trustor in trust violation and repair process. Third, as 
trustee's behavior is quantified, it can easily manipulate the extent of trust building / violation by 
changing player B's decision on how much to return to player A. Finally, such game setting 
avoids many unnecessary confounding because it does not require face-to-face interaction or 
other factors that may introduce noises. 
Repeated investment game has been used many times in trust repair research. In such game, 
players participate in a series of independent rounds of game with the same partner, and profits 
are accumulated across all rounds. According to the theory of repeated game, trust can be built 
and stabilized between player A and player B within repeated interactions. Furthermore, in many 
studies that are interested in trust recovery from trustor's (victim's) perspective, participants all 
play the role of player A while player B is actually a confederate. 
Researchers can manipulate player B's trustworthiness by changing player B's decision on the 
ratio of return. For instance, i f player B returns half o f mutual fund to player A, player B is 
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usually considered as trustworthy (e.g., Schweitzer, Hershey, and Bradlow, 2006; Dirks et al., 
2011; Desmet, Cremer, and Dijk，2011). I f player B takes all the mutual fund and return nothing 
to player A, it is considered an exploitative behavior. In the current study, to further strengthen 
this connection between player B,s decision making and perceived trustworthiness, instructors 
also tells participants that according to observation from previous game sessions, a good partner 
returns half o f the mutual fund while a bad one takes all as an extreme. 
Specific Game Settings in Study 1 
In every round of game, participants had an initial capital o f $10 and decided to pass a certain 
amount of it for each round. Money passed would be multiplied by six and become a mutual 
fUnd that is to be allocated by player B. Money not passed was considered a fixed income that 
increased according to a fixed income rate that differed between two alternative groups (to be 
covered later). Participants first practiced for two rounds of game and then passed a simple quiz 
testing the rules in the game, after which they might proceed to the real game with an assigned 
partner (who was a confederate with pre-determined behaviors). There were eight rounds of 
game in total, and trust violation occurred in the second round, after the first round that was used 
to confirm and build trust. And then, after six rounds of trust repair stage, participants were 
asked to answer a few questionnaire items that checked on the effectiveness of manipulations. 
Computer Interface 
In earlier years, trust game was conducted in paper-and-envelop method with human monitors 
controlling the process and collecting data. Computer-aided method was not used until recent 
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years. In this study, the experiments were programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher 2007) and were tailor-made. Participants played the game in front of computer 
screen throughout the experiment. A l l experiments took place in PC Labs, where computers were 
provided and soIIware is installed. This computer-aided interface was reliable and standardized 
because it controlled possible unexpected impacts of human monitors. It also had the advantage 
of convenience and saving labor payments because there was no need to employ or train human 
monitors. 
Procedure 
A 2x2 bctwecn-siibjects experiment with repeated measures was conducted on 90 students Ironi 
two universities in I long Kong. There were several experimental timcslols and each involves no 
more than 20 participants. Participants were recruited by campus mass-mailing or voluntary 
participation after class. They were told to play a computer-aided game that challenges their 
calculativc as well as interpersonal skills. Special care was taken to convince them on the 
existence of player Bs. In most cases, two groups of participants were recruitcd in an experiment 
timcslot and seated in two adjacent rooms. While two groups of participants were actually all 
playing player A, they were told that participants in the other room were playing the opposite 
role (player B). For participants who were invited to the experiment at the end of a business 
course lecture, they were told that their partners were students from another university who 
would start the game simultaneously. This explanation was realistic because these participants 
know that the experiment instructor was from a diflercnl university. Al l participants were paid 
with a show-up fee of $30 I IK l ) lor 30 minutes of participation. Participants were also told that 
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there would be a lottery draw within those whose win profits above average. The prize value 
would be in line with the game profit with an expectation of around $200 HKD. The monetary 
incentive was to invoke and keep consistency with side bet assumption that individuals were 
seeking economic returns (Becker, 1960). 
Upon arrival, participants received handouts explaining the game settings with written guidelines 
and graphical illustrations. After all participants were seated, instructor explained the experiment 
settings and content o f the handout. Then participants were asked to practice for two rounds with 
a practice partner (which was also a confederate) and answer a small quiz that checked 
participants' correct understanding of the game rules. The game would not launch until 
participants answer all quiz questions correctly. 
Participants were told that they would be randomly assigned with a partner and play with this 
partner throughout the game. Both player A (participants) and player B (confederate) were 
making decisions simultaneously and they would not learn about each other's decision t i l l the 
end of each round. And participants were told that they wi l l play for about ten rounds of game, 
but the actual number of rounds would not be told in order to avoid opportunistic behavior. This 
practice was adapted from Schweitzer, Hershey, and Bradlow (2006) to avoid "end-game 
behavior from the main part of the experiment" (p. 6). For example, it could avoid attrition effect 
(Girden, 1992) because participants would be impatient and pay less attention i f they knew the 
game was in the final stage. 
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The overall procedure can be explained as Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1 Experiment Procedure of Study 1 
PRD1 PRD2 RD1 RD2 RD3 RD4 RD5 RD6 RD7 RD8 I I I I I I I I I I I 
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Trust building was achieved before participants began the game with a history reference. It was 
used immediately after participants were assigned with partners at the beginning o f game. 
Participants were told that their partners had all participated in a previous session of the same 
game, and their actions had been recorded and provided as a reference to understand about their 
partners. In the history reference, participants would see that their partners conducted consistent 
trustworthy behavior (always return half of the mutual fund). 
One might ask why trust building was not achieved in a more direct way in which participants 
play with their partners with successful cooperation for several rounds. Although this approach 
seems more direct, it is not appropriate to for the current study for at least three reasons. First, it 
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cannot control for the individual difference and brings much noise. For example, i f a participant 
always chooses to pass the lowest amount of money while his/her partner is manipulated to 
distribute mutual fund evenly, the participant may interpret partner's trustworthy behavior as a 
“ t r ick” to entice the participant to give out more money. In that case not only trust building is 
failed but distrust is introduced. History reference can avoid this kind o f unexpected effects 
without losing much power on trust building effectiveness. Second, trust violation may not be as 
effective i f the violation occurs in middle or late stages of interaction. Lount et al. (2008) found 
that victims soon recover from the violation and their trust level did not differ from no-breach 
control group after an immediate negative effect. Third, positive prior history has been proven to 
be influence trust repair in (Tomlinson et al., 2004) that victims are more wi l l ing to reconcile i f 
the past relationship is positive. This effect w i l l decrease the sensitivity of current study and 
therefore should be avoided. History reference does not have such problem because the 
consistent trustworthy record is not from interaction with the participant but with someone else. 
In brief, history reference is a "cleaner" way to build trust than using several rounds in the 
experiment to build up trust. 
Verbal communication that expresses cooperative intentions was proven to help trust building 
(Schweitzer, Hershey, and Bradlow, 2006; Dirks et a l , 2011; Desmet，Cremer, and Dijk, 2011). 
Therefore in order to further strengthen the trust building process, participants would also receive 
a short message from their partners saying "let's cooperate". This message was actually pre-
written and sent by computer automatically. 
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The first round of game was also used to confirm and reinforce trust building so that partners' 
behavior were designed to be trustworthy (i.e., return half of mutual fund). 
Trust Violation 
As mentioned above, i f player B，s decision is to return half o f the mutual fiind, player A w i l l 
perceive it as trustworthy behavior (e.g., Schweitzer, Hershey, and Bradlow，2006). Similarly, 
trust violation can be achieved by changing player B's decision into taking all from mutual fund. 
In this study, trust violation was achieved at the second round after one round o f trust building. 
The reason why violation was placed in the early stage was because it had been found that trust 
violation at the late stages was mild or has no violating effect at all (Lount et al., 2008), which 
means trust violation might not be effective i f it were placed in later rounds. 
Trust Repair 
Among all the reparative tactics proposed in existing literature, the most fundamental and 
convincing one is consistent trustworthy behavior (Schweitzer, Hershey, and Bradlow, 2006) 
because no other reparative tactics can withstand unless followed by consistent trustworthy 
behavior. This tactic is simple and direct for trust rebuilding, which enables concentrated 
attention on other aspects of the experiment that are closely related to the research question at 
hand. Meanwhile, this operationalization is widely used in trust repair researches that also 
involve trust game experiment (e.g., Dirks et al., 2011; Desmet, Cremer，and Di jk, 2011). Hence, 
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trust repair was achieved by partners' consistent trustworthy behavior after violation in the 
second round and all remaining rounds were trust repair stage. 
Trust Measurement 
Trust was measured by participants' decision on the amount of money passed in each round of 
game. One might argue that this behavioral measurement is an outcome of trust instead of the 
attitude of trust. Indeed, trusting behavior is not a direct measure of trust cognition, but this 
measurement can appropriately serve the research purpose of this study for several reasons. First, 
previous studies have proved that attitudinal trust and behavioral trust show similar pattern in 
such kind of game setting and behavioral trust is believed to highly correlate to attitudinal trust 
(Schweitzer, Hershey, and Bradlow, 2006). Second, measuring trust repetitively wi l l be 
vulnerable to the possibility that participants learn about the real purpose of this game and be 
biased in making decision and answering attitudinal questions. This would severely jeopardize 
the validity of the study, which is something more unaffordable than some minor challenge on 
accuracy of measurement. Third, it is meaningful to study behavioral trust in such economic 
relationships because such context evokes economic rational and hardly touches on other aspects 
of trust such as affect (McAllister, 1995), which means behavioral trust strongly represents the 
trust perceptions as influence from other factors is minimized. 
Investment Manipulation 
Investment was manipulated as the sunk cost associated with maintaining the relationship. 
Participants were required to pay a "partnership service fee，，to system at the beginning of each 
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round so as to simulate reality in which cooperative relationships always needed preceding costs 
to build up and maintain. This service fee was considered as an operationalization of investment 
because it was a cost related to the relationship and would be worthless i f the relationship were 
discontinued, which was in line with the definition of investment. The service fee was set to be 
$15 for high investment groups and $1 for low investment groups. 
Alternative Manipulation 
Quality of alternative was manipulated by changing the return ratio of fixed income from money 
kept. As "passing money" and "keeping money" were two alternative options, changing the level 
of return ratio could be regarded as manipulation of quality of alternative and influence the 
relative attractiveness of trusting partner (passing money). For the high-quality-of-altemative 
condition, money kept could receive a fixed income at 110% so that the total return from money 
kept was 2.1 times. Meanwhile, for the low-quality-of-altemative condition, money kept could 
receive a fixed income at 5% so the total return was 1.05 times the amount of money kept. By 
changing the return ratio of fixed income, keeping money was manipulated to be either more 
attractive or not. 
Manipulation Check 
A l l questionnaire items in this study are 7-point Likert-liked scales. Respondents were asked two 
items regarding their perception of the attractiveness of keeping money to check the 
manipulation of quality of alternatives. They were also asked two items whether they felt that the 
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partnership service fee was expensive so as to check on the manipulation of investment size. 
Details can be found in Appendix A. 
4.2 Results 
Manipulation Check 
Trust level immediately after violation was tested against the trust level right before violation so 
as to check on the effectiveness of trust violation, which turned out to be successful {t (89) = 6.16, 
P < .001; M = 8.18, SD = 2.44 (Round 2, before violation) vs. M = 5.90，SD = 3.34 (Round 3, 
after violation)). 
Investment manipulation was checked by two items with good reliability (Cronbach's a =.94). 
Two items were averaged and tested between investment groups and was found to be 
significantly different between two groups {t (65.80) = 6 . 0 3 , < .001; M= 4.12, SD=\.1\ (low 
investment group) vs. M= 5.99, SD = 1.01 (high investment group)), which indicated that the 
manipulation of investment was successful. 
Alternative manipulation is checked by two items with acceptable reliability (Cronbach's 
a =.88). After taking average on these two items, it was found that two alternative groups differ 
significantly in their perception of alternative {t (88) = 3.80, .001; M二 3.21，SD = 1.47 (low 
alternative group) vs. M= 4.42, SD = 1.52 (high alternative group), which showed that the 
quality of alternative was manipulated effectively. 
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Repeated Measures Analysis 
This study used repeated measures design and analysis. In this session I w i l l briefly introduce the 
repeated measures analysis to provide a basis for future discussion. The repeated measures 
means the same individuals are measured on a number of occasions corresponding to each 
treatment level (Girden, 1992). In repeated measures the variation caused by within-subjects 
factors and the variation caused by between-subjects factors are partitioned out in analysis. The 
total variation is divided into between-subjects and within-subjects, and the within-subjects 
variance is further divided into between-treatment and error (Howell, 2007). This means the 
individual differences is completely removed from the error term, which largely increases 
equivalency before treatments. Repeated measures has many advantages such as strong 
equivalency and decrease on the number of subjects, but in this study repeated measures is used 
because it is the appropriate approach when the research question concerns performance trend 
over time. 
In repeated measures, the between-subjects factors correspond to treatment levels. For instance, 
in the current study, there are two factors (investment and alternative) and each has two levels, so 
the between-subjects design is a 2 x 2 design. The main effects of between-subjects factors are 
testing whether means of dependent variables are equivalent in all treatment conditions, just like 
analysis of variance except that the estimated means are absorbed from a series of repeated 
measures. Repeated measures also allow interaction of between-subjects factors, which is also 
similar to the interaction effect in analysis of variance. 
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The within-subjects factor in the current study refers to the rounds (or time) of trust game and 
each round indicates a treatment level of the within-subjects factor. The main effect of within-
subjects factor tests the null hypothesis that all means are equal across treatment levels, which in 
this study means the means of trust behavior is equal in each round. A main effect means at least 
one round is different with the other rounds in terms of participants' trust behavior. 
In this study, what I am interested in is the interaction between the within-subjects factor (round) 
and between-subjects factors (investment or alternative). This interaction effect tests whether the 
simple main effect of within-subjects factor is different in different between-subjects treatments. 
In other words, the interaction answers whether changes in trust behavior in each round are 
different in each investment or alternative conditions. I f a Round x Investment or a 
Round X Alternative interaction is found, it provides evidence of the influence of continuance 
commitment on trust violation or trust repair. Further analysis can be used to test the direction of 
interaction so as to directly test the hypothetical relationships proposed earlier about continuance 
commitment's buffering effect in trust violation and acceleration effect in trust repair. 
Meanwhile, the repeated measures design has an assumption of sphericity which requires that 
variances of the differences for all pairs of repeated measures be equal (Girden, 1992). But this 
assumption is oftentimes violated and adjustments in degree of freedom can help address the 
positively biased F ratio (Howell, 2007). There are two widely-used methods to adjust s， 
Greenhouse-Geisser(^) and Huynh-Feldt ( ^ ) (Howell, 2007), and both adjustments can be 
achieved by SPSS Repeated Measures Analysis. Box (1954) and Greenhouse and Geisser (1959) 
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proposed an adjustment of i so that the within-subjects portion of analysis of variance is 
approximately an F distribution. Huynh and Feldt (1976) found that this correction tends to be 
conservative when s is large, and they recommended another approach of ^ . In the rest of 
thesis where sphericity assumption is violated, I follow the suggestion of Girden (1992) to adjust 
degree of freedom by Huynh-Feldt (Huynh and Feldt, 1976) when s>.15 as Greenhouse-Geissor 
is too conservative in such conditions, and adjust by Greenhouse-Geissor (Greenhouse and 
Geissor, 1959) when s<J5 as departure from sphericity is large. 
Hypothesis Testing 
As the study was a two between-subjects factors (2x2) and one within-subjects factor design, the 
repeated measures analysis would be appropriate to test hypothesized relationship in this study. 
Before testing the hypothesis, however, it should be helpful to take a look at the overall pattern 
for some intuitive observations (Figure 2) 
Figure 2 Overall Pass Behavior in Study 1 (Estimated Marginal Means) * 
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It could be observed that as trust violation occurred in round 2, trust level reached the bottom at 
the end of round 2 and then gradually picked up during the six trust repair rounds. 
The covariance matrix (Table 1) might also provide some information for basic observations. 
The high correlation of pass behaviors in different rounds also indicated the importance of 
repeated measures design as it could partial out this component and therefore increased the 
sensitivity of analysis. 
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Table 1 Correlation Matrix of Passing Behavior in Study 1 
M e a n S D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
l . p l ^ -
2. p2 8.18 2.44 .63** -
3.p3 5.90 3.34 .47** .30** -
4.p4 6.10 3.09 .34** .14 .57** -
5.p5 6.98 2.93 .41** .21* .40** .63** -
6. p6 7.17 2.99 .49** .26* .40** .56** .72** -
7. p7 7.64 2.82 .33** .40* .40** .44** .71** .67** -
8. p8 8.06 2.44 .32** .11 .48** .45** .74** .70** .75** -
N=90 ~ 
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In order to study the trust repair process, it was above all necessary to establish a baseline that 
trust repair did exist, as it was the basic assumption i f we would like to look further into the 
impact of commitment. Therefore, the first issue was to check the existence of trust repair. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted the existence of trust repair. Results showed that time had a main effect 
in within-subjects effect in trust repair stage (F (3.87，332.40) = 17.43,p<.001), which indicated 
that the means of p3 to p8 are not all equal. To further test i f this inequality was caused by trust 
repair, trust level at the beginning of trust repair (p3) was compared against that in the end of 
trust repair (p8), and result showed a significant difference (,(89) =6.73,p<.00\; M= 5.90, SD = 
3.34 (p3) vs. M = 8.06, SD = 2.44 (p8)). Hypothesis 1 was supported to prove that trust repair did 
exist and trust level significantly increased after several rounds of trust rebuilding. 
Hypothesis 2 and 3 were aimed at examining the impact of investment and alternative after trust 
violation such that trust decline of victims with high investment or low alternative would be 
larger than the rest. Both hypotheses were not supported (investment: 86) = .51,p = ns; 
alternative: 86) 二 .15,；7 = ns) as there was no significant interaction between time and 
investment or between time and alternative in within-subjects effects, which meant the change in 
passing decision over time was not influenced by the condition of investment or alternative. 
Hypothesis 4 and 5 examined the effect of investment and alternative in trust repair and 
predicted that high investment and low alternative had a positive impact on trust repair and 
would accelerate trust growth. The sphericity assumption was violated ( s <.75) so degrees of 
freedom were adjusted with the more conservative Greenhouse-Geissor method. These 
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relationships were not significant as no within-subjects interaction was found in trust repair stage 
(investment: F(3.87’ 306.37) 二 1.95,p = n.s.\ alternative: F(3.87, 306.37) = .46,p = n.s.�, which 
meant trust repair over time did not differ across investment or alternative conditions. 
Results from study 1 supported hypothesis 1 that trust level grew after victims observed 
consistent trustworthy behaviors from the violator. However, no evidence was found to support 
hypothesis 2 to 5 and no effect of continuance commitment was found in the trust violation or 
trust repair stage. This null effect was probably because the manipulations of investment size and 
quality of alternative in two aspects. First, as the manipulations were embedded in the game 
setting, participants might be less sensitive to such manipulations because they accepted them as 
part of the game rules and the cognition of continuance commitment was not evoked as expected. 
Second, embedded manipulations might not successfully simulate reality because, unlike real 
situations, there were no benchmarks for participants to understand whether their investment size 
was large or not or whether their alternative was attractive or not. This suggested the need for 
more powerftil manipulations that were independent from basic game settings, which was the 
reason why study 2 is conducted. 
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5 Study 2 
Study 2 was aimed at improving the manipulations of study 1 in hope of evoking the cognition of 
continuance commitment and answering the research question better. This study was also a 
repeated measures design with two between-subjects factors and one within-subjects factor, but 
it differed from study 1 in several ways. First, it used the same basic game setting but different 
methods to manipulate independent variables. Rather than using manipulations embedded in the 
game setting like study 1, study 2 employed external manipulations that were independent from 
the settings of trust game. Moreover, the scope of initial capital for each round was increased 
from $10 to $100 so as to increase participants' sensitivity on monetary decisions. Further, 
unlike in study 1 where trust violation happened after one round of confirmation on partner's 
trustworthiness, trust violation was designed to occur immediately in Round 1.1 changed this 
design because confirmation was found unnecessary as the trust level was already high in Round 
1 and did not improve significantly in Round 2 ( F ( i , 86) = 2.31,p =似).Meanwhile, all other 
settings in experiment and the approaches used in data analysis, i f not particularly specified, 
were same as in study 1. 
5.1 Methodology 
A 2x2 between-subjects experiment with repeated measures was conducted on 78 students 
recruited from the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Like in study 1, there were several 
experimental timeslots and each involves no more than 20 participants. 
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Game Settings 
Participants had an initial capital of $100 for each round, and they should decide to pass a certain 
amount of money ($51-$100). The range of $51-$100 was to facilitate the alternative 
manipulation, which would be covered later. Money passed would be multiplied by four and 
become a mutual fund that is to be allocated by player B. 
Investment Manipulation 
Immediately after partnership was randomly assigned，participants were required to send a "g i f t " 
to their partners using money from their game profit account (i.e., the final profit would be 
income earned from game minus gift cost). Investment size was represented by gift price such 
that a gift with high price ($200) was a large investment while a cheap one ($5) was a small 
investment. As participants were randomly assigned to two groups with different investment size 
(high/low), they were assigned with gifts with different prices. There were several steps to ensure 
the effectiveness of this manipulation. First, participants were asked to brainstorm three reasons 
why a gift was helpful in building up relationship with partner and why an expensive gift was 
more helpful than a small gift. It would prime participants to believe that this fictitious gift was 
an investment that can effectively build up relationship with partner. Second, at each price group, 
three gift options were provided and each gift option was presented together with a picture. Gift 
option increased involvement on gift-sending and pictures provided detailed visual information. 
This operation was important because it reinforces participants' impression on gift and addressed 
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participants' lack of involvement in gift-sending caused by the fact that gift price was assigned 
by system. Third，gift price displayed on screen for the first few rounds as a reminder. 
Manipulation check at the end of game would test whether participants could well remember 
their investment size by checking on their perception of gift price. 
Alternative Manipulation 
Besides playing the game with assigned partner, participants were provided with an alternative o f 
“quitting”. I f participants chose to quit, their interaction with partner terminated and they would 
receive a fixed income instead of the original game payoff for each round that remains. The 
profit before quitting would stay the same. Here "quitting" was an alternative to cooperation, and 
the quality of alternative could be manipulated by changing the profitability of quitting (75% for 
high alternative or 25% for low alternative). I f the profitability was considerable, participants 
may choose to terminate the cooperation with partner for more reliable income. Instead, i f the 
profit was poor, participants may continue cooperation with partner even i f the trust level was 
low because quitting was not an attractive choice. 
It was mentioned earlier that player A 's decision on passing money should be between $51 and 
$100. This range was set because $51 could be considered as a cutting line and any amount more 
than $51 would indicate trust to partner. I f participants do not trust partner, they should choose to 
quit instead of passing an amount more than $51. I f they were allowed to pass $50 or less, 
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quitting would be barely considered as an alternative because quitting would shut the door to 
future cooperation or profitability. 
Procedure 
After instruction on game rules, participants first practiced for two rounds. And then they were 
required to finish a task that asks them to elaborate on gift importance and the effect of gift price. 
Afterwards they were assigned with a partner, they read the history reference of their partners, 
who also sent a message to suggest cooperation. Participants were required to send a gift at the 
beginning of game, and the gift price was assigned to be high or low. There were seven rounds in 
total, and the first round was a trust violation round in which player B took all the money from 
mutual fund. The six rounds afterwards were trust repair stage in which player B always returned 
half of mutual ftind. Participants were not told the exact number of rounds, same as study 1，to 
avoid unnecessary noises in the final stages. As partners' behavior was designed to violate trust 
in the first round and became trustworthy in the second round, gift was designed not to send out 
immediately but to arrive on the third round so that participants would not attribute partner's 
behavioral change to gift. While gift arrived late, the price of gift was deducted at the beginning 
of game. When gift arrived, player B was designed to show appreciation by slightly increasing 
the ratio of return (10%). The whole flow of procedure could be described in Figure 3 below. 
Figure 3 Experiment Procedure of Study 2 
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5.2 Results 
Manipulation Check 
Seven-scale items were used to check on trust building, trust violation, manipulations of 
investment size, and manipulations of quality of alternative. 
A t the end of the first round, participants learnt that their partner took all the money from mutual 
fund. The effectiveness of trust violation could be tested by comparing participants' pass 
behavior in the first round (before violation) and the second round (immediately after violation). 
After filtering participants who chose to quit, result showed a significant decrease in trust (r(72) 
=5.29,p<.001; M - 87.03, SD = 17.20 (Round 1，before violation) vs. M= 74.66, SD = 20.49 
(Round 2, after violation)), which indicated successful trust violation. 
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To check i f manipulation of gift as an investment as successful, there were two aspects that 
needed to be addressed. First, after elaboration (brainstorming) on gift importance and the effect 
of gift price, participants should be convinced that gift could help build up relationship and 
expensive gifts should have stronger impact. Two items were respectively used to check on this 
and both turn out to be significantly higher than the neutral score of 4 {till) = 4.92�/7<.001, M二 
4.92，SD = 1.66; till) = 636,p<m\, M= 5.32, SD = 1.83). Another four items were used to 
check different groups of investment (high/low) to see i f they perceived their gift investment to 
be high or low. The reliability of four items showed internal consistency (a=.9l) and were 
averaged to test whether two groups significantly differed (t(76) = 13.07,/><.001; M= 2.52, SD = 
1.31 (low investment group) vs. M= 5.83, SD = .91 (high investment group)). Results showed a 
good manipulation on gift and the effects lasted t i l l the end of experiment. 
Three items, with one reversed, were used to check i f participants believed quitting option was 
attractive in terms of payoff. Reliability was comparatively acceptable ( a =.70). The scores of 
three items were averaged and compared between low alternative group and high alternative 
group. Results showed successful manipulations (,(76) 二 3.39，/7<.01, M= 3.20, SD = 1.14 (low 
alternative group) vs. M= 4.18, SD = 1.37 (high alternative group)). To establish a robust 
conclusion, I also tried to exclude the reversed item because it might suffer bias due to attrition 
effect. Reliability was improved ( a =.85) after deleting the reversed item, which confirmed that 
this item was less appropriate than the other two items. However, conclusions were still the same 
after deleting the reversed item {t{16) = 3.19, jiK.Ol, M = 3.31, SD = 1.40 (low alternative group) 
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vs. 4.40, SD = 1.56 (high alternative group)) and it was safe to conclude that this study 
passed the check on alternative manipulation. 
Hypothesis Testing 
Before testing hypothesis, it was worthwhile to take an overall look in order to gain intuitive 
understanding about the results. 
The correlation matrix of all seven rounds of passing behavior (denoted as p i to p7) could be 
illustrated by Table 2. 
Table 2 Correlation Matrix of Passing Behavior in Study 2 
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 5 7 
1 .p l 8 7 ^ 1 7 ^ — 
2. p2 74.66 20.49 .45** -
3.p3 85.15 18.27 .59** .58** -
4. p4 79.35 18.99 .62** .44** .68** -
59 
5.p5 85.00 16.56 .53** .39** .70** .65** -
6. p6 87.64 16.70 .45** .32** .67** .56** .76** -
7. p7 84.57 17.87 .59** .27* .51** .77** .67** .63** -
*/?<.05 
Figure 4 showed the overall pass pattern with estimated means obtained from the analysis of 
repeated measures. 
Figure 4 Overall Pass Behavior (Estimated Marginal Means) in Study 2* 
* The scale of pass behavior was 51-100 as participants were asked to pass money between $51 and $100. 
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Before testing hypotheses, it should be noted that there were two unexpected decline on overall 
pass decision in Round 3 and marginally in Round 7 (F(l, 69) = 2.96,p<.iy Possible reasons 
wi l l be discussed later in this chapter. 
As this current study was a two-between-one-with in factors repeated measures design, the 
analysis of repeated measures was frequently used here. Specifically, hypothesis 1, 4, and 5 were 
interested in trust repair stage, while hypothesis 2 and 3 were interested in trust violation stage. 
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Two separate repeated measures analysis were conducted on trust violation stage (Round 1-2) 
and trust repair stage (Round 2-7) respectively. Table 2 showed the analysis on trust violation 
stage and Table 3 showed that on trust rebuilding stage. "Alternative" and "Investment" were 
two between-subjects factors, and "Round" was the within-subjects factor. Money passed in each 
round was denoted as "p i " , "p2", • " , "p7". 
Hypothesis 1 predicted the existence of trust rebuilding. The first step was to find out i f Round 
had a main effect as a within-subjects factor in trust rebuilding stage. Results confirmed the main 
effect of Round as a within-subjects effect {F (3.30, 227.61) = 12.18, j!?<.001), which indicated 
that p2 to p7 were not all equal. To further test i f this inequality was caused by trust rebuilding, 
several pairs of means were compared for a robust conclusion. Comparison between p2 and p7 
showed a significant difference 0(72) = 3.65,pc.OOl; M= 74.66，SD = 20.49 (p2) vs. M = 84:57, 
SD = 17.87 (p7)). For a more robust and conservative test, I averaged p6 and p7 to represent the 
trust level in end-stage and avoid fluctuation due to random factors that might influence the trust 
score in p7. The averaged score was compared against p2 and yielded a similar result (t(72)= 
4.59,/?<.001; M= 74.66, SD = 20.49 (p2) vs. 86.11, SD = 15.58 (p6-p7)). Hypothesis 1 was 
supported that trust repair did exist and trust level significantly increased after several rounds of 
trust rebuilding. 
Hypothesis 2 was interested in the impact of investment after trust violation and predicted that 
trust decline of victims with high investment would be lower than those with low investment. 
This hypothesis was not supported {F{\, 69) = A \ , p = ns) as there was no significant interaction 
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between Round and Investment in within-subjects effect, which meant the variation of passing 
decision over time was not influenced by the condition of investment. Participants in high 
investment group and low investment group were not significantly different in terms of passing 
behavior over time. 
Quality of alternative was hypothesized to influence trust violation such that the magnitude of 
trust decline would be lower when quality of alternative was poor than when quality of 
alternative was good, which was suggested in hypothesis 3. It was again not supported ( F ( l , 69) 
=AS,/? = ns) as no significant interaction between Alternative and Round was found, which 
showed that no significant difference exists between two alternative groups in terms of their pass 
behavior change within trust rebuilding stage. 
Hypothesis 4 and 5 examined the effect of investment and alternative in trust repair. Investment 
was hypothesized to have a positive impact on trust repair and increase trust level. This 
relationship would be supported i f significant interaction existed between Investment and Round 
in trust rebuilding stage. Results indeed, though marginally, indicated such interaction (F(3.30, 
227.60) 二 2.15,p = .09), which meant there might be a difference between two investment 
groups in terms of trust repair over time. It should be noted that sphericity assumption was 
violated {6<.15) SO degrees of freedom were adjusted with the more conservative Greenhouse-
Geissor method. 
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In order to have a clearer look on this relationship, we could refer to the plot for an intuitive 
observation (see Figure 5). It would be concluded from the plot that the most significant 
difference occurred in the early stages and tended to get weaker in later phase. To better 
understand how investment influences trust repair, a simple contrast was used to compare each 
round (p3 to p7) against trust level immediately after violation (p2). Results showed that 
significant interaction of Investment and Round occurred between p3 and p2 (F(l，69) = 8.54, 
/?<.01) but not between other pairs. This meant investment interacted wi th trust change over time 
in the first round after violation but not afterwards. Therefore, it would be meaningful to look 
particularly at this round to understand how investment affected trust repair, and through 
separate two-way (Investment x Alternative) analyses (Howell, 2007, pp. 487) it was found that 
the influence o f investment was not significant in p2 (F(l ,69) = .24, p = ns.) but became 
significant in p3 (F(l，69) = 1.52,/»<.01; M = 77.74, SD = 2.88 (low investment group) vs. M = 
91.77，SD = 2.73 (high investment group)). This supported the hypothesis that high investment 
positively would influence the growth of trust level in trust repair. Furthermore, we could see in 
Figure 5 that trust level reached a peak upon gift arrival, and decreased for a certain extent after 
gift has arrived 0(72) = 3.33,p<.01). This also indicated that gift as an investment would arouse 
reciprocity expectations (Gouldner, 1960) and increased trust level. The arrival o f gift was as 
meaningful as gift-sending itself in terms of positive effect on trust repair. In brief, hypothesis 4 
is supported. 
64 




80- / / 、：、 
/ /、、、、、、、、、/ 





‘ I n I 1 1 — 1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Round 
The test on hypothesis 5 was quite similar to hypothesis 4. To test how quality o f alternative 
influenced trust repair, I first looked at the within-subjects effects to see i f Alternative had a 
significant interaction with Round. As the interaction turned out to exist marginally 
(F(3.30,227.60) = 2 . 2 8 , = .07), it was necessary to look at the plot for an intuitive observation 
* The scale of pass behavior was 51-100 as participants were asked to pass money between $51 and $100. 
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(see Figure 4). It was apparent that low alternative and high alternative groups differed in the 
early stage after violation but tended to be similar afterwards. Helmert contrast compared each 
round level against later stages and the results suggested that the interaction of alternative on 
trust repair over time occurred (F(l,69) = 4.79, p<.05) in the first round after violation (p2-p3). 
Therefore, it would be necessary to look particularly at this round to find out how alternative 
influences trust repair. Simple effects in two-way analyses showed that alternative had 
significant influence on p2 (F(l,69) = 4A8,p<.05; M = 69.25，SD = 3.57 (low alternative group) 
vs. M= 79.02, SD = 3.18 (high alternative group)) but not so on p3 (F(l,69) = .73,/7 二 肌；M= 
83.06, SD = 2.96 (low alternative group) vs. M= 86.45, SD = 2.64 (high alternative group)), 
which meant that although trust level of low alternative group was significantly lower after trust 
violation, it picked up faster and cleared up the difference after one round of trust repair. 
Therefore, it could be concluded that alternative increased trust level in trust repair and 
hypothesis 5 was supported. 
Figure 6 Pass Behavior (Estimated of Means) by Alternative Conditions in Repair Stage* 
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Compared to study 1, more supportive evidences were found in study 2 as it manipulated 
investment size and quality of alternatives more appropriately. Several conclusions could be 
drawn from study 2. First, in line with the findings in study 1, trust could be repaired by 
violator's consistent trustworthy behavior. I f victims of trust violation observed consistent 
trustworthy behavior from the violator, their trust for the violator would increase and trust was 
effectively repaired. Observing consistent trustworthy behavior would improve victim's trust 
level on violators. 
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Second, effectiveness of trust repair differed between victims with high continuance commitment 
and those with low continuance commitment. I f victims had large investment or had poor 
alternative, their trust tended to pick up faster in trust repair. Furthermore, these effects were 
found to occur in the early stages of trust repair. There might be two reasons to explain these 
early effects. First, as observable from the overall trend of passing behavior, there were "upper 
limits" of trust both in study 1 and study 2 (Figure 1 and Figure 2). Continuance commitment 
accelerated trust repair so trust level reached the upper l imit faster for victims with high 
continuance commitment. But afterwards trust increased mildly and there were no difference on 
the increase tendency between high and low continuance commitment groups. Another possible 
interpretation was that the effect of continuous commitment was reflected only when something 
outstanding happened (i.e., partners became trustworthy after violation trust). This was probably 
due to the nature of lab context as participants were involved in short-term interactions. We 
might expect a lasting effect of continuous commitment in reality i f the relationship were long-
term in nature. 
No evidence supported the hypothesis that trust violation was buffered by continuance 
commitment as difference on decline of trust was found in violation stage between high or low 
commitment groups. This null effect could be specific to the experimental design of this thesis 
because trust building was achieved by positive history reference rather than real interactions 
between trustor and trustee. 
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Meanwhile, there were two unexpected issues that should be noted about the tendency o f the 
overall pass decision. First, the arrival of give on Round 3 introduced a peak on pass decision but 
this increase did not sustain to the next round. This could be interpreted as a reflection of 
participants' reciprocity expectation that although they did not trust their partners as much, they 
chose to pass a large amount of money because they believed that their partners would give a 
good return ratio as partners received gifts from them. This temporary increase could not 
represent real trust level but indicated a "man-made" fiction. I f there were no gift arrival in 
Round 3，we would probably see a smooth upward trend from Round 2 to Round 4. Another 
issue worth noting was the decrease in the last round (Round 7). The decrease was only marginal 
under simple contrast of repeated measures analysis (F( l , 69) = 2.96, p< A ) and the standard 
error was comparatively large (SD - 17.87). Therefore, we might interpret this decline as a 
random occasion but not something meaningful Meanwhile, another possibility was that as the 
experiment approached to its final stage, participants were nervous that their partners would 
exploit mutual fund at the end of partnership because participants would loose control over their 
partners i f there were no future rounds of passing decisions. 
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6 Discussion 
In the present study, continuance commitment is introduced in trust violation and trust repair 
stage because continuance commitment is believed to increase the resilience of trust relationship 
in face of turbulence. Continuance commitment is the behavior tendency to remain in the 
relationship based on recognition of costs associated with discontinuing the relationship (Meyer 
and Allen, 1984). It has two sub-dimensions of investment size and quality of alternative 
(McGee and Ford, 1987). Two studies were conducted in order to answer the question of 
whether and how continuance commitment plays a role in trust violation and trust repair. 
Violator's consistent trustworthy behavior was found to be an effective approach in trust repair 
as it was supported by both study 1 and study 2. I f victim of trust violation observes violator's 
consistent series of trustworthy behavior, their trust for the violator would gradually increase. 
This reparative tactic is a further confirmation of previous trust repair research (e.g., Schweitzer, 
Hershey, and Bradlow, 2006). 
I also hypothesized that continuance commitment is a "buffer" in trust violation in a way that 
trust level would be less damaged when trust is violated. However, no evidence supported this 
proposition in both studies. One explanation of this null effect is that previous interaction is 
needed to "activate" the buffering effect. The buffering effect is based on cognitive adjustment 
(Festinger, 1957) that victims might devaluate alternatives (Rusbult and Martz, 1995) or make 
favorable attributions for the violator (Takaku, 2001), but victims may not make favorable 
cognitive adjustments for a stranger. Instead, this cognitive adjustment might occur i f the victim 
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and violator have long and positive relationships (Tomlinson, Dineen, and Lewicki, 2004; Lount 
et al.’ 2008). This possibility can be tested in future research after manipulating the interaction 
history between trustor and trustee. Another possible reason for this null effect could be the 
nature of experiment. As participants' interactions with partners were short-term in nature, 
participants' involvement was not strong enough to evoke cognitive adjustments. There would 
probably not be a null effect i f the interaction was long-term and it is worthwhile to testify this 
possibility in future studies. 
It is also suggested that continuance commitment would accelerate trust repair so that trust is 
better repaired i f commitment is high. Results supported this effect that trust repair is faster 
among participants who have high investment to the relationship or are offered poor alternatives 
i f the current relationship is terminated. Meanwhile, it was found that the accelerating effect o f 
continuance commitment happened in the early stage o f trust repair. One possible explanation 
was that there was an "upper l imit" for trust repair. Trust level reached its upper l imit soon i f the 
continuance commitment was high and vice versa. After reaching the upper limit, continuance 
commitment would not have any accelerating effect as trust growth became mild no matter i f 
continuance commitment was high or low. 
The present study might push forward current research in several ways. Firstly, it introduces 
commitment as a contextual characteristic of trust relationship，which is not found in other 
research and yet meaningful for the understanding of trust repair. Previous research on the topic 
of trust repair tend to focus mostly on reparative tactics or trust repair process (e.g., K im et al, 
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2004, 2006; Ferrin et al., 2007) and not many mentioned the contextual factors that also serve as 
an important aspect in trust repair (Tomlinson，Dineen, and Lewicki, 2004). Secondly, as 
mentioned before, most research on trust repair start from the standpoint o f violators rather than 
victims (e.g., Dirks et al., 2011), and yet according to the bilateral model (Kim, Dirks, and 
Cooper, 2009) both parties are equally influential. This study addresses the imbalance by 
emphasizing the power of victim and answers whether victim's resistance on trust repair is 
contingent on their commitment level. Thirdly, this study employs a repeated measures design 
and examines the within-subjects interaction, which is able to capture the developmental changes 
in trust level within individual and compare the differences of this development in group-level 
(Howell, 2007). This analytical method may potentially be a useful tool in trust research i f the 
research question also involves both group-level and individual-level variables. Fourthly, the 
technical method of computer-aided repeated trust game is a fine approach to filter out chaos o f 
experiments based on scenarios or face-to-face interactions (Schweitzer, Hershey, and Bradlow, 
2006). As all the manipulations and measurements are quantitative, it opens a door to "cleaner" 
experimental design and well addresses the economic component of trust and commitment. 
Undeniably, this study is vulnerable to several limitations that need to be addressed in future 
studies. First of all, trust violation and trust repair are tested in one study instead of being 
separately studied. Although statistically controlled (Girden, 1992), the difference of trust level 
at the beginning o f trust repair cannot be ruled out theoretically as this experiment design cannot 
partial out the effect of trust violation in trust repair stage. In other words, trust level is not 
controlled to a parallel level across different experiment groups at the beginning of trust repair as 
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tast level is assumed to decline differently after violation due to the effect of commitment. 
Given that both trust violation and trust repair occurs after manipulations of investment and 
alternative, it might be challenged that different patterns of trust repair found is caused by 
difference in trust violation rather than the independent variables proposed. 
Despite potential vulnerability, this challenge is not fatal for at least three reasons. To begin with, 
the difference o f trust level at the beginning of trust repair is well-controlled statistically (Girden, 
1992), and therefore the findings on trust repair stage are reliable. What needs to be addressed is 
more a theoretical argument rather than a validity issue of the finding. Besides, theoretically it is 
also important to remember that even i f the difference in trust repair is caused by difference in 
trust violation such difference is still caused by continuance commitment as it is commitment 
that introduces difference in violation in the first place. Moreover, as trust repair always occur 
after trust violation, the conclusions of commitment's positive effect on trust repair is practically 
meaningful no matter even i f the confounding argument is true. Therefore, we have good reasons 
to believe the findings on trust repair withstand the challenge. But anyway, future studies are 
necessary to separate trust violation and trust repair process for a "cleaner" conclusion. 
Meanwhile, this research employs a cognitive perspective and conceptualized commitment in a 
cognitive approach accordingly (McAllister, 1995; Meyer and Allen, 1984). The affective side is 
comparatively untouched, which makes the findings in this research less applicable to situations 
where affective factors play a dominant role, especially when affective factors and cognitive 
factors have opposite impacts. For instance, when the negative affect caused by betrayal in 
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romantic relationship is extremely strong and overwhelming, vict im may overlook the effect 
caused from continuance commitment and leave his or her partner no matter how big the 
investment size is or how poor the alternative is. In such circumstances, trust repair should be 
only weakly related to continuance commitment or not related at all because the affective 
component is too strong to counteract. We should be cautious when applying the findings to 
different kinds o f trust relationships such as close relationships, manager-subordinate 
relationships, customers relationships i f there is evidence implying the role o f affects. However, 
it is worthwhile to mention that although this limitation is theoretically reasonable, empirical 
evidences implies otherwise in that previous studies still found supportive evidence on the effect 
of continuance commitment in relationships with heavy affective proportion such as romantic 
relationships (Johnson and Rusbult, 1989; Rusbult and Martz, 1995). Future studies are needed 
to clarify about whether and how much continuance commitment influences trust repair where 
affective component is influential and establish boundary conditions o f when the findings in this 
thesis are applicable. 
Another issue that needs to be addressed is the external validity o f this study. Like all other 
experimental studies, this study employed an artificial laboratory environment that might be 
unrealistic in the eyes o f many researchers. However，we may still trust the findings in this 
experimental study for the fol lowing reasons. For one thing, the game context is frequently used 
in many trust repair studies and are quit well-established as an appropriate approach. For another, 
as the experiment is based on calculative cognitions o f trust and commitment that are basically 
economic rational, it suffers less challenge on extemalization because calculative rational is 
74 
relatively stable under different contexts i f compared with other "soft" factors such as affect or 
emotions. Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that experimental design enjoys the 
advantage o f avoiding uncontrollable factors and provides stronger control. In the current 
research，the unpredictable influence o f face-to-face interaction is avoided and continuance 
commitment is operationalized in a most reliable way through quantitative settings. The 
advantage o f better control is more important for the research question of interest, and hence 
experiment is adequate for the purpose of this study. 
The results found in this thesis may shed light on managerial practices. According to the findings 
in the present research, organizational trust is stronger in face of turbulence i f continuance 
commitment is high. Therefore, in order to foster stable trust in work relationship that withstands 
violations, organization can build up high continuance commitment among employees and 
managers such as increasing mutual investment. This connection based on continuance 
commitment is advantageous because it can be easily implemented by economic policy and takes 
effects immediately. 
Future research may expand the research question to a broader definition of trust or commitment 
with affective dimension involved. Specifically, affective trust repair may be examined to see i f 
it correlates to affective commitment, and whether the commitment-trust relationship are 
different under cognitive dimension and affective dimension. Another possible direction is to 
integrate the abundant studies of trust repair tactics with the perspective of commitment to see 
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which tactics works best under different commitment levels. Furthermore, an interesting question 
to ask is whether there is an "upper l imit" of repaired trust and does it relate to commitment. 
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Appendix A: Manipulation Check Items 
Study 1 
Fixed income is the profit you get from money kept. What would you say about the profitability 
of Fixed Income i f you compare it with the amount of money kept? Please describe by answering 
how much you agree or disagree with the following items. 
1. Fixed Income is very attractive because it is considerably higher than the amount of money 
kept. 
2. The profitablity of Fixed Income is good as I can earn much more than the amount of money 
kept. 
"Partnership Service Fee" is the fixed charge that occurs at the beginning of each round. I f you 
compare this service fee with the initial capital ($10) you receive at the beginning of each round, 
what would you say? Please describe by answering how much you agree or disagree with the 
following items. 
1. The service fee in each round is expensive. 
2.1 have paid a lot on partnership service in each round. 
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Study 2 
Gift Manipulation Check “ ‘ 
L GeneT^n^T^^^S^Ii i^：^!^^^ help build up 
2. Expensive gifts should have stronger positive impact than cheap gifts. 
3. M y gift has a higher price than other gifts. 
4. Compared with other gifts, I have invested considerably by sending this 
gift. 
5. This gift costs much. 
6.1 have spent a lot on this gift. 
Alternative Manipulation Check “ “ “ 
1. This return ratio makes quitting not that bad." “ 
2. The profit is acceptable under quitting option. 
3. Quitting is so unprofitable that it does not worth consideration at al. 
(REVERSED) 
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Appendix B: Screen Capture of Experiment 
PRACTICE SESSION 
There are two parts in practice session. 
1, Game Practice 
Ybu wifi be assigned with a practice partner and practice for two rounds 
2 Sample Test 
You wjfi need to pass a simple qulzlo show that you understand the rules of game setting. The game will not proceed until I the questions are answered cmrectty 
I i«xiL> n 
inSi：；-；：;'-^^^  
DECISIOH OF MOtCy TO PASS 
Note, please make your PASS decision between C and 1D 
Please make yaur decision far Round 1. $ j j 
I smat ‘ I 
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•OUTCOME 
Your partner decided to return 43% from mutual fund. 
：• Your Income is calculated below: 
, Money Passes T " "— . “ ； — ~ — 
. Partner's Decision : : � � � : ： H e t u r n 43<fe of mutual lund / ： : : : 
Money Received from Partner . . . . . . . : . ; . . . . ： 
. _ : MoneyKept . ‘ ： “ ~ " . ： . . 
: I nco rne f rom MoneyKepJ ‘ ..: . ： ： . .,:. -. • “ / . 
• • . “ “ Partnership Service Fee , ： :::... — ~ ~ .$1500 ~ “ ~ r - — . . 
. ： T o t a l Irjcoms . .... ； • . • “ ^^ ~ ~ ’ ~ 一 • — — 
1' 1 
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